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Abstract The contextualisation of Hans Morgenthau’s thought has been significantly 
advanced in recent years. Uncovering the intellectual relationships Morgenthau had with Max 
Weber, Friedrich Nietzsche, members of the Frankfurt School, or even Carl Schmitt has not 
only revealed the development of political discourses in the Weimar Republic, but it has 
helped to rectify interpretational shortcomings of realism and encouraged scholarship to 
apply realist principles to twenty-first century world politics. Despite this comprehensive 
contextualisation, the “thinking partnership” between Morgenthau and Hannah Arendt has 
attracted so far only rhapsodic elaborations. This neglect is surprising because, at a time when 
the financial crisis in Western democracies is gradually turning into a crisis of democracy 
itself, a close reading of them offers a kind of social criticism whose implications are worthy 
of consideration.  
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Introduction 
Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau shared the fate of many émigré scholars. Both were 
educated in Continental European humanities, but the rising wave of anti-Semitism denied 
them the possibility to pursue academic careers in Germany. Both were forced to emigrate to 
the USA and it is there where they became ‘thinking partners’ (Young-Bruehl, 1982, p. xv).  
In International Relations (IR), this thinking partnership yet awaits an in-depth 
discussion. Following Patricia Owens (2005a, p. 30), one reason might be that Arendt herself 
is neglected in IR. As Arendt does not generally have a place in the IR-canon, elaborations of 
Morgenthau’s intellectual relationships have focused on more firmly established scholars in 
the discipline, like Carl Schmitt and Max Weber (cf. Williams, 2005; Scheuerman, 2009). 
Furthermore, Morgenthau’s name is connected to realism. This connection has equally 
hindered explorations of their partnership because, as Ian Hall (2011, p. 47) notes, Arendt is 
commonly not related with realism. However, there are contributions which acknowledge 
similarities. Christoph Rohde (2004, p. 98) mentions that Morgenthau is intellectually 
indebted to Arendt, creating a first incentive to further elaborate the similarities in their 
thought. Equally, Owens (2009) encourages investigating their relationship. She remarks that 
both were concerned about depolitisation in modern democracies and shared a similar 
understanding of the political. So far, Douglas Klusmeyer (2005) has brought forward the 
most elaborate analysis of this thinking partnership. He reasoned that, despite their common 
life trajectories, both differed in that the Shoah became only constitutive of Arendt’s political 
thought. In a further article Klusmeyer (2009, p. 342; more nuanced: 2011) argues that this 
difference had great bearing and was responsible for the pair’s diverging understandings of 
the political. 
This paper dissents Klusmeyer’s assessment. Rather, Richard Ned Lebow’s (2003, p. 
292, also: Hayden, 2009, p. 19 and Scheuerman, 2011, p. 115) suggestion is taken up as it is 
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argued that their thoughts are characterised by fundamental similarities. Both followed an 
ethics that encourages reconsidering the human condition of politics. Despite the fact that the 
Shoah had different influences on them, they still were, what Arendt (1978, pp. 65-6) called, 
‘conscious pariahs’ because their intellectual development was informed by the worldview of 
Weimar’s Jewish middle-class. This common ground of the ‘Judeo-Christian tradition … 
[and] Greek and German philosophy’ (Morgenthau Papers, Container 33) fostered similarities. 
An elaboration of their partnership is not only interesting in terms of IR’s sociology of 
knowledge, but their thought also has implications for contemporary IR-theory. Arendt and 
Morgenthau were concerned about depoliticising tendencies in modern democracies. For both, 
economy (oikos) and politics (polis) were constitutive societal spheres. However, the political 
broke down in modern democracies because economics underwent transformations which 
reduced humans’ ability to cooperate and hindered the development of a public sphere 
(Arendt, n.d.). Both scholars argued that ideologies constrain free and reflective thinking and 
that the development of consumer societies does not only heighten the inability of people to 
act, but the possibility of action is gradually vanishing altogether. To confront these 
developments, they aimed to re-establish the political sphere.  
The following discussion reflects this shared criticism. Economy and politics are 
spheres that condition sociation. For Arendt and Morgenthau, their existence was not 
naturally given, but they considered them cultural spheres in the sense that they are 
constantly recreated through human efforts. This societal division is reflected in the 
conceptual framework of this paper, as the Aristotelian concepts of oikos and polis are used 
to which both referred.  
 
Oikos: The Inability to Act 
Labour and Work 
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We have to consider first the oikos because, for Arendt and Morgenthau, it was in this private 
realm in which people received the competence to then act in the public realm. Modernity’s 
scientific and technological advancements changed people’s lives dramatically, and both 
scholars did not disavow their benefits. New means of communication and transportation 
were welcomed by Morgenthau (1973, pp. 51-3) because it enabled people to engage with 
their coevals even over long distances. He hoped that this would lead to a more sustainable 
peace because people were given the possibility to overcome spatio-temporal distances. 
However, both scholars shared the concern that modernity would not be able to fulfil all 
expectations. In fact, Morgenthau (1972, p. 2) argued that ‘science … elates man with the 
promise to transform homo faber, the maker of tools, into homo deus, the maker of worlds, 
[but] it also depresses him.’ Attempting to create life-worlds through social planning would 
lead to a scenario in which human creativeness would have no room. Alfons Söllner (1996, p. 
241) is, therefore, right to argue that Arendt’s thought (and Morgenthau’s) is characterised by 
a history of decline. To demonstrate this decline, both scholars referred to two ideal types: 
homo faber and animal laborans. Homo faber is the ideal typification of work, while animal 
laborans stands for labour. Both thinkers feared that modernity, in which homo faber aspired 
to become homo deus, would reduce the former to animal laborans. 
Homo faber experiences him-/herself as an autonomous subject through his/her work. 
Creating objects enables homo faber to master physical and artificial tools. The choice of 
tools, the object’s purpose, and even the decision to create an object are all within homo 
faber’s liberty. In addition, the creation itself happens without outside interference (Arendt, 
1958, pp. 143-4). However, working in solitude does not mean that homo faber is 
disconnected to the world (Arendt, 1953, pp. 303-6). Rather, homo faber enters a discussion 
with his/her coevals through the produced objects. These objects are reified manifestations of 
their creators’ subjectivity which can be cognitively experienced by others. Homo faber, 
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therefore, has an interest to produce high-quality objects, not only because this publicly 
demonstrates his/her mastery, but because the objects’ durability will leave traces beyond 
his/her death (Arendt, 1958, pp. 118-9). This aspect leads Patrick Hayden (2009, p. 94) to 
conclude that this ‘fabrication of tangible “worldliness” … guarantee[s] the permanence and 
stability without which the human world would not be possible.’ Morgenthau even argued 
that death itself can be an experience in which humans gain awareness of their own self. By 
committing “suicide with a good conscience”, people have the ability to master their 
biological death by choosing its place, time, and tenor (Morgenthau, 1930b).  
Modernity, however, reduces work to labour. Mass production constrains people into 
industrial processes over whose purpose they do not have control. Regulatory frameworks 
were created that deny people the autonomy which they require to become aware of their 
subjectivity. Life as animal laborans is not characterised by an aspiration for mastery, but is 
reduced to mere self-preservation through the acquisition of financial means in order to be 
able purchase commodities to sustain one’s life (Arendt, 1958, p. 90). This concern is 
likewise to be found in Morgenthau. He argued that modernity perpetuates mediocrity 
because humans are not encouraged to make use of all their abilities. Rather, a mediocre 
effort is sufficient to fulfil one’s task within the production process and any further effort 
would make no difference. Therefore, the world of animal laborans ‘compels its members to 
live below their capabilities rather than exhausting them. It misdirects their energies and 
wastes the best of their talents’ (Morgenthau, 1960b, p. 79).  
Unlike homo faber, animal laborans does not have the capacity to contribute to the 
creation of life-worlds; instead he/she is characterised by ‘worldlessness’ (Arendt, 1958, p. 
115). As Cara O’Connor (2013, pp. 110-1) states, being reduced to physicalness, out of a 
concern for self-preservation, does not allow animal laborans to experience subjectivity. This 
prevents people from engaging in the public sphere because only homo faber has the capacity 
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to get into contact with his/her coevals through the use and display of objects. Animal 
laborans, by contrast, is absorbed by a cycle of subsistence which denies the possibility of 
continuity. In this cycle, people cannot give meaning to their life by mastering their life-
worlds which makes death ‘the ultimate shock to human experience’ (Morgenthau, 1976, p. 
5). Karl-Heinz Breier (2011, p. 35) corroborates this account in saying that even by giving 
birth to a new generation, animal laborans does not contribute to the creation of life-worlds. 
This could only happen if his/her thought and/or action would be of relevance for posterity. 
Animal laborans, however, can only pass on physicalness. 
This worldlessness leads to loneliness. Being constrained into industrial processes 
ingrains replaceability to animal laborans, as it does not allow self-fulfilment or awareness of 
one’s subjectivity (Arendt, 1953, p. 323). Animal laborans’s loneliness is a sign of his/her 
inability to engage with other people (Young-Bruehl, 2006, p. 85). Lacking subjectivity in the 
sense of being aware of individual abilities and interests, hinders him/her from establishing 
intersubjectivity by engaging with others in the political sphere. For both, the reduction of 
work to labour in the age of modernity was, therefore, endangering the political.  
 
Ideologisation  
Loneliness was for both thinkers one reason for the rise of ideologies and totalitarianism in 
the twentieth century. Both were deeply concerned about the apoliticism that was abetted by 
ideologies. Following Klusmeyer (2009), it was particularly the Shoah-experience that 
informed Arendt’s thought. Due to the devastation of this experience, she dedicated her 
scholarship to the elaboration and support of liberty. Morgenthau’s thought, too, cannot be 
understood without considering this experience and the advancing ideologisation of the 
Weimar Republic. Throughout his life, Morgenthau returned to questions of ideologies and 
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depolitisation. In Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt identified three elements that 
characterise ideologies: 
First, ideologies do not aim to understand spatio-temporal contingent events, but they 
purport to be able to explain the entire course of history by providing ‘world explanations’ 
(Arendt, 1962, p. 469). She (1962, p. 470) noted that ‘[t]he claim to total explanation 
promises to explain all historical happenings, the total explanation of the past, the total 
knowledge of the present, and the reliable prediction of the future.’ Ideologies turn history 
into world history, and they are not restricted to the past in their temporal scope. Rather, 
ideologies also provide policy procedures for future actions. Arendt argued that this 
teleological processuality of a coherent historical fiction deprives people of their ability to act 
because they are reduced to mere executors of the ideology.  
Ideologies also instil hubris in people. Vibeke Schou Tjalve (2008) and William 
Scheuerman (2009) note that hubris looms large in Morgenthau’s ethics. With the rise of 
nationalism in the last century, Morgenthau was exposed to the consequences of hubris in 
world politics. As he argued in La Réalité des Normes (1934), there are moral, societal, and 
legal restrictions which hinder the outbreak of violence. However, morality is the only 
restraint on the international scene, and there, seemingly, it had vanished. Based as they were 
upon assumptions of divine rights and/or natural law, nationalistic ideologies encouraged 
their followers to pursue their power ambitions on the international level. For success was 
embraced within the coherent historical fiction of the ideology. Furthermore, as ideologies 
know no spatial restrictions, nation-states pursue universalistic ambitions in their attempt for 
ideological fulfilment. The resulting nationalistic universalism ‘tries to impose a new order 
upon a fragmented and anarchical political world, and it does so by using its own national 
order as a universal model’ (Morgenthau, 1966, p. 8). This turned nation-states into ‘blind 
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and potent monster[s]’ (Morgenthau, 1962a, p. 61) which threaten to descend the world into 
chaos in the pursuit of their various ideological ambitions.  
Second, Arendt (1962, pp. 470-1) criticised ideologies for emancipating from 
experience because ideologies accept human experiences only to a limited extent. In order not 
to jeopardise their spatio-temporal processuality, only those experiences which are 
ideologically consistent are accepted as real. To guarantee that as many experiences as 
possible are in line with ideological world explanations, ideologies attempt to reify life-
worlds to match thought-constructs consistent with the tangible reality. For Arendt and 
Morgenthau (1977, p. 127), this reification of reality happened through the advance of 
bureaucratisation, as it is used as a means of violence to support authority. This happens 
through the creation of norms and rules, which define social life-worlds, and administration 
apparatuses which ensure that they are enforced. In addition, dichotomies of good and bad 
and right and wrong are used to define normality. This dictates life-trajectories, as humans 
can only develop in clearly defined channels. Deviations from the norm are punished with 
social ostracism, financial coercion, or even physical persecution (Morgenthau, 1959, p. 5; 
1974, p. 15; Arendt, 1970, pp. 6-13). People accept reifications of their life-worlds because, 
to borrow György Lukács’s (1963, p. 41) phrasing, ideologies promise to free from 
‘transcendental homelessness’. They fill the metaphysical void that modernity had left people 
in by promising to re-enchant their worlds: allocating them a place among the masses for the 
attainment of the ideology’s goal.  
Logical-deductive reasoning was for Arendt the final element that characterised 
ideologies. From an assumed premise, ideologies would deduce their entire thought-construct 
with absolute congruity. This allows them to become a substitute for reality because they 
offer their followers a life free of antagonisms. Having been deprived of the ability to think 
and reflect freely and critically, people are willing to ‘be commanded into a fool’s paradise or 
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fool’s hell in which everything is known, explained, and characterised by a priori definitions 
based on supernatural laws’ (Arendt, 1974, p. 159). 
Both scholars criticised social sciences for providing the grounds for ideologies to 
establish such a substitute for reality, rather than critically reflecting on it. Morgenthau (1944, 
p. 174) saw this evidenced in its efforts to contribute to social planning by arguing for a 
‘method of the single cause’. With this method, they aim to mimic natural sciences by 
developing approaches based on logical-deductive reasoning which imply that, in the social 
world, the development of one particular effect could be explained by one particular cause. 
However, both scholars argued that the tangible facts of reality have no meaning in 
themselves because they can acquire different empirical meanings depending on the space 
and time in which they are considered. Epistemologically, social sciences require 
hermeneutic and context-sensitive methods, although there are ‘perennial problems’ that 
affect their study throughout time and space (Morgenthau, 1962b, p. 110; 1971, p. 77; Arendt, 
1970, p. 7). 
 
Worldlessness and Worldconsumption 
Their final objection to modernity was the rising consumerism it conditions. Embedded into 
labour processes which reduce people to mere physicalness, people neither achieve nor do 
they aspire to mastery. They are not able to experience themselves as subjects, which is why, 
in their worldlessness, they consume rather than create life-worlds. For Arendt (2005, p. 198), 
a dilemma had caused this state of affairs. She admitted that the rapid increase of productivity 
was only possible because animal laborans, whose sole task left is the sustainment of self and 
family, had seized the public sphere. This increase in productivity even freed people from 
subsistence concerns because, at least in the Western World, provisions became available 
abundantly. However, this development also led to the downfall of the public sphere and, 
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indeed, ever-increasing ideologisation further brings forth depoliticised societies in which 
there exists only publicly displayed privateness.  
To face this worldlessness and to give meaning to their lives, people began to follow 
the ‘assumption of classical political economy that the ultimate goal of the vita activa is 
growing wealth, abundance, and the “happiness of the greatest number”’ (Arendt, 1958, p. 
133). For Arendt, like Morgenthau, this was evidenced in the replacement of commodities by 
the consumption of goods. People consume material objects to display their wealth and how 
far they have advanced in the labour process. In such societies, the quality of the objects that 
homo faber creates are inappropriate because people are not supposed to master their life-
worlds, and their lifespan hinders people in their constant reassurance of their position in life. 
Rather, the ‘shop-window quality of things’ (Simmel, 1997, p. 257) is sought after because 
with each purchase people assure themselves and others of their position. For Morgenthau, 
one reason for this consumerism was to be found in human nature. Being labourers, self-
assertion cannot be directed in mastering a trait or accomplishing a task, but it also cannot be 
suppressed (Morgenthau, 1930a, p. 70). Consumerism is, therefore, a way for humans to 
satisfy their self-assertion because, in making purchases, they manifest their abilities within 
the channels left by their reduced animal laborans condition. This ‘element of prestige’ 
(Morgenthau, 1960b, p. 69) has resulted in ‘meaningless growth’ (Morgenthau, 1972, p. 23). 
Consumerism, however, was criticised by Arendt and Morgenthau for an implication that is 
even more far-reaching than the reification of the assumption of growth. It is not only a 
channel to exhaust self-assertion, but it is a threat to human existence itself.  
Both scholars were concerned that unrestricted consumerism would lead to a ruthless 
enforcement of the human drive for self-assertion which would, in turn, enter into conflict 
with the drive for self-preservation. In a ‘society of waste’ (Morgenthau, 1960a, p. 215) 
goods are produced and consumed for no other purpose than producing and consuming ever 
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greater quantities, thereby squandering limited natural resources. The worldlessness of the 
animal laborans, therefore, may turn into world consumption because animal laborans 
threatens to destroy the natural environment upon which social life-worlds are constructed.  
  
Polis: The Ability to Act 
The Political 
Arendt and Morgenthau were concerned about societal developments in which the oikos 
gradually replaced the polis as the central means of sociation (Owens, 2009, p. 107). Their 
critique was not only restricted to the socio-economic effects of modern jobholder societies 
(Arendt, 1958, p. 46), but they also developed a political ethics of responsibility by 
reconsidering the political. Particularly three elements characterise the political for Arendt 
and Morgenthau. 
First, as homo faber introduces one’s objects into the public realm, they are made 
tangible for others and in this experience, intersubjectivity is constituted (Heuer, 2006, p. 9). 
In Arendt’s (1958, p. 7) words, ‘[a]ction … corresponds to the human condition of plurality, 
to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world … this plurality is 
specifically the condition … of all political life.’ Hence, the political is a sphere of diverse 
people who cooperate through speech and action by bringing in their subjectivity in a 
mutually reflective process. This happens through an exchange of interests, which 
Morgenthau (2012, p. 126) termed ‘discussion’. These discussions constitute political 
meaning. Morgenthau’s terminology (“colouring”) indicates that meaning is not given or 
inherent to the objects in question, but it is created through human interaction; meaning is 
characterised by specific historical contingency and provisionality. For both, social reality is, 
therefore, only accessible in the political realm as it is there where people ‘form a world 
between them’ (Arendt, 1973, p. 175). 
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Second, Morgenthau (2012, pp. 123-6) argued that the political has to be made up of 
‘spheres of elasticity’. It has to be a flexible realm in which not only divergent interests have 
to be accommodated, but also the expanding knowledge base. For, although politics is an 
endeavour to settle “perennial problems”, the knowledge that is created while finding 
solutions to these problems and the political orders that are established in the course of their 
settlement are conditioned by space and time. Morgenthau (1962a, p. 110) referred to Karl 
Mannheim’s Standortgebundenheit according to which each generation and each society will 
have to find new answers to these problems. Arendt (1958, p. 199) also argued in this vein. 
For her, the political was a ‘space of appearances’. The socio-political reality people 
experience as tangible is not given or based upon absolute facts; Arendt argued instead that 
this reality is created through the intangibility of the in-betweens of a specific context. The 
meaning people attach to objects or events in this context has meaning only then and there 
(Owens, 2005b, pp. 51-2). Therefore, the political has to be flexible in which discussions 
about meaning-allocation can evolve without restraints.  
Third, this process cannot evolve without conflicts and may even cause violence 
because of the ‘plurality of opinions’ (Vollrath, 1995, p. 56). What supports this assumption, 
in Bonnie Honig’s (1993, p. 93) words, is that this is ‘a radically contingent public realm 
where anything might happen, where the consequences of actions are boundless, 
unpredictable, unintended, and often unknown to the actors themselves.’ To avoid the 
looming danger of violence, Arendt and Morgenthau endorsed the evolution antagonisms of 
interests in order to counter depolitisation in modern democracies. Only then would it be 
possible to allocate political meaning and contribute to the creation of social life-worlds. The 
political, therefore, stands in contrast to ideologisation. In ideologised societies, conflicts 
have to be suppressed because they would undermine the claim of world explanation unless 
these conflicts happen to support the ideology.  
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Although Arendt and Morgenthau agreed that antagonisms have to evolve freely, they 
took different stances on its requirements. Arendt argued that through their evolution political 
liberty is established in the sense that the involved people will realise that only in this process 
of mutual suasion are all their interests considered. This is why she gave glowing accounts of 
American town hall meetings. These meetings epitomised for Arendt (2005, pp.  243-5) an 
ideal-typical political process because people managed to find viable solutions by themselves 
through expressing and listening to diverse interests. This belief in the self-preservation of the 
political process substantiated her affection for Morgenthau because she considered him a 
‘man of praxis, of action’ (Young-Bruehl, 2006, p. 34). Particularly Morgenthau’s 
involvement in teach-ins during the Vietnam War endorsed her perception (Arendt and 
McCarthy, 1995, p. 217). Morgenthau, by contrast, was less optimistic about the self-
preservation of the political, which is why he repeatedly discussed the concept of wise 
statesmanship. For Morgenthau, it is the statesman’s task to establish fora in which 
antagonisms can evolve. In addition, statesmen are supposed to help in aligning the diverse 
interests and ensuring that all of them are considered in the process of formulating a common 
good according to public support.   
 
Power 
The elaboration of the political has demonstrated that Arendt’s and Morgenthau’s concept of 
power diverges from its common understanding. Usually, power is thought of along the lines 
of Weber’s well-known definition as the ability to impose one’s interest on others through 
physical or mental force. With such an understanding of power, however, the political could 
not evolve. Intersubjectivity could not be established because enforcing one’s interest does 
not allow free and open-minded exchanges of interests. In addition, the political could not be 
formed because a sphere of elasticity as imposing one’s interest discourages flexibility in 
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thought and action. In the case of Arendt, her opposition to Weber’s concept is well 
documented (Habermas, 1977, pp. 3-4; Owens, 2009, p. 110). In the case of Morgenthau, this 
is different. The scope of his concept of power is still contested in academic debates. It is for 
this reason that this paper first turns to Morgenthau. 
Morgenthau, like Arendt (1973, p. 181), distinguished between two concepts of power 
(Rösch, forthcoming; also: Solomon, 2012). In its empirical form, he described power as 
coercion and, normatively, he argued for power as collective action. The former is well 
researched, for we know that in developing his empirical concept Morgenthau considered 
Freud and Weber. Robert Schuett (2010) concludes that, despite Morgenthau’s (1984, pp. 13-
14) later attempts to renounce Freud’s influence, he relied on his sexual instinct in 
formulating his notion of self-assertion which formed the essence of Morgenthau’s concept of 
power. For his elaboration of its consequences, Morgenthau relied on Weber. In Politics as a 
Vocation, Weber (2004, p. 33) noted that ‘[w]hen we say that a question is “political” ... we 
always mean the same thing. This is that the interests involved in the distribution or 
preservation of power, or a shift in power, play a decisive role in resolving that question.’ 
Christoph Frei (2001, p. 130) ascertained that he already referred to these strategies in his 
doctoral thesis, but he elaborated them only later. In Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau 
(1948, p. 52) noted that ‘[a]ll politics ... reveals three basic patterns ... either to keep power, to 
increase power, or to demonstrate power.’ Politics Among Nations demonstrates that 
Morgenthau considered power so-defined to be evidenced in the time of nation-states in 
which he lived because ideologies encouraged its use. Its popularity, and the widespread 
assumption that with this book Morgenthau would have brought forward his international 
relations theory, encouraged scholars to criticise Morgenthau for supporting ruthless power 
politics and nationalistic worldviews.  
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However, although Morgenthau analytically dealt with power as coercion, he 
normatively argued for the invigoration of power as a collective affair. Indeed, it is this 
understanding of power that demonstrates most his thinking partnership with Arendt. In 
Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt (1962, p. 474) referred to Edmund Burke’s “acting as 
concert” to formulate her concept of power. Later, she further remarked that ‘[p]ower 
corresponds to the human ability not just to act but act in concert. Power is never the property 
of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group 
keeps together’ (Arendt, 1970, p. 44). Power signifies the consent of people to temporarily 
come together in collective speech and action in order to create institutions and norms 
(Arendt, 1970, p. 41; also: Owens, 2005b, p. 53). For Arendt (1970, p. 51), like Morgenthau 
(1929, p. 51), power was not a means, but was an end in itself, which explains why both 
distinguished between power and violence. This distinction is epitomised in Morgenthau’s 
stance towards the 1960s student protests. He argued that violent outbreaks were a 
consequence of their disempowerment. In other words, they protested against their inability 
to contribute to the creation of their life-worlds; an inability caused by ideological 
affirmations of the status quo (Morgenthau, 1968, p. 9). Correspondingly, as Rohde (2004, p. 
98) and Owens (2009, p. 110) argue, violence is a potential consequence when normative 
power is absent and it is a characteristic of empirical power. Power is only legitimised 
through collective action as Arendt and Morgenthau distinguished between legitimate and 
illegitimate power.  
 
Bürgerwissenschaft 
Central to Arendt’s and Morgenthau’s thought was the accentuation of the human condition 
of politics, as Arendt (1965, p. 1-2) argued for politics to be a scholarship of worldly concern. 
In a letter to Paul Nitze from 12 February, 1955 (Morgenthau Papers, Container 44), we find 
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similar remarks from Morgenthau. He even affirmed that not only the world is the object of 
academic concern, but also that the scholar him-/herself is part of that world. 
Their common intellectual background in Continental European humanities and their 
experiences of ideological atrocities were the foundation for framing political science, in 
Breier’s (2011, p. 7) words, as a Bürgerwissenschaft. Arendt and Morgenthau did not create 
knowledge with the claim to provide absolute answers to political questions: they did not 
support academic attempts to socially plan the world, and they were critical of the personal 
proximity that particularly IR held with public policy makers. Rather, they intended to 
support people in being able to live freely in the sense of being able to critically reflect on the 
current political status quo and have the opportunity to create their life-worlds (Smith, 2010, 
pp. 109-12). In other words, Arendt and Morgenthau aimed to support a condign human life. 
Morgenthau, particularly, became engaged in the public sphere (Cozette, 2008; Tjalve, 
2008). He argued that scholarship has to be a corrective of the political status quo by 
discerning people’s political interests through discussions and by establishing fora in which 
the political could re-evolve. For Morgenthau, scholars, therefore, had to act as facilitators of 
the political through which people could transcend various constraints in modern societies in 
order to free them in their thought and action and to help them creating their life-worlds.  
However, as Morgenthau (1955, pp. 446-7) was well aware of, convincing others of 
their capacities by challenging vested interests, causes discomfort among people because 
their habitual ways of thinking are questioned. During the height of the Cold War, critical 
thinking was not well-received because questioning the foundations of common beliefs was 
considered a societal threat. Numerous records exist documenting the negative personal 
consequences Morgenthau suffered as a result of his work. He even claimed that the FBI and 
the White House pursued an “Operation Morgenthau” (Morgenthau Papers, Container 27) to 
collect imputations against him (Cox, 2007, p. 184; Cozette, 2008, p. 17). 
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Despite their criticism, Arendt and Morgenthau were ardent supporters of American 
civic culture (Owens, 2005a, p. 35; Schulz, 2006, p. 144). Even at times, when the 
ideological penetration of socio-political life seemed irrevocable, they were surprised about 
its assimilative capacity (Vollrath, 1995, pp. 53-4). The shared criticism of Arendt and 
Morgenthau was, therefore, not a criticism of substance, but a criticism voiced in fear that the 
USA would lose its culture; a loss that both experienced in the downfall of the Weimar 
Republic. Dolf Sternberger’s (1976, p. 941) claim that Arendt turned into ‘a convinced 
“political” American, a citizen by heart’ is a legitimate description of both Arendt and 
Morgenthau.    
 
Conclusion 
This paper has contributed to the elaboration of Arendt’s and Morgenthau’s thinking 
partnership. It was demonstrated that, due to their common concern about the effects of 
modernity on political sociation in democracies, their partnership deserves to be the topic of 
further academic discourses. Their assessment of depolitisation shows strong similarities 
because of their common socialisation in Continental European humanities and Shoah-
experiences. Particularly Morgenthau profited from this partnership because Arendt pushed 
his criticism beyond a mere description of the socio-political status quo. Both thinkers 
pursued a normative world postulate.  
This world postulate was the establishment of a world community. Both scholars 
reflected in their works on the increasing ideologisation of life-worlds brought about by the 
dominance of the nation-state on the international level. They left no doubt that they 
considered nationalism and bureaucratisation as the biggest threats for people to live in peace 
and liberty. Hence, neither Arendt nor Morgenthau were apologists of the nation-state. 
However, repudiating nation-states did not make realists ingenuously pursue the promotion of 
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a world-state, as Scheuerman contends. Rather, realism encourages critically attending these 
efforts. Scheuerman (2011, p. 150) argues that realists help ‘defenders of the global state to 
stay sober’. Because realism stresses the potential of war, a world state would not end the 
depolitisation of modernity, and one could not develop political identities in a world state. In 
addition, its establishment would equally block people from making full use of their 
capabilities, for a world state would also encourage homogenisation and despotism 
(Scheuerman, 2011, pp. 154-68). 
Contrastingly, Arendt’s and Morgenthau’s thought allows for considerations about the 
establishment of a world community. This makes their agenda an important contribution to 
IR in which peace and conflict studies and concepts like global governance are heatedly 
discussed more than ever. Such a global community could be established through political 
spheres that transcend natural and national borders. By enabling people to get together on 
various different levels and settings, these spheres would allow for the creation of 
intersubjectivity which would, in turn, help to reassure them of their worldly orientation and 
find suitable compromises which are considerate of all. Compromises can be found because 
the flexibility of political spheres allows them to accommodate numerous and diverse human 
interests. The resulting self-reflexivity and open-mindedness helps to accept different life-
trajectories which are influenced by historical, cultural, socio-political, or religious factors. 
This acknowledgment of the spatio-temporal conditionality of knowledge is, finally, a means 
to hinder turning discussions into dialogues. The purpose of dialogues is to establish a 
consensus within a national context. However, despite good intentions, institutionalised 
dialogues fail to establish consensus because they are not conceived as an open process with 
equal rights for all. Rather, they are set up with the intention to affirm the status quo in which 
a minority has to adopt the regulations of a majority. What is more, these dialogues reduce 
people to ethnic-religious otherness and create an irrevocable we-they-dichotomy that had not 
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existed before. In political spheres, however, people are acknowledged for their differences 
and, through discussions, a common ground is established that suits everybody. Conceiving a 
world community through re-establishing political spheres cannot be implemented through 
attempts of social planning by national administrations or on a collective level through (inter-
)national foreign policy making. It is, instead, a long-term process in which well-educated 
citizens emerge as willing and able to engage in discussions and do not shy away from the 
conflicts involved. 
 
About the author Felix Rösch is senior lecturer in International Relations at Coventry 
University. Prior to his appointment at Coventry, he has been a Centre Associate at the 
Newcastle University Jean Monnet Centre and a visiting scholar at the Paul H. Nitze School 
of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University in Washington. In addition, he 
was a DAAD-JSPS visiting scholar at the Kansai University in Osaka. His research has been 
published amongst other with the Journal of International Political Theory, Review of 
International Studies, and Politics. His research interests focuses on International Political 
Theory, classical realism, European émigré scholarship, and Japanese political thought. 
 
Acknowledgments I am grateful to Hartmut Behr, Seán Molloy, as well as the participants 
and the audience of the Reorientating Realism Workshop, which took place at the University 
of Edinburgh in June 2012, for their helpful, encouraging, and engaging comments.  
20 
 
References 
Arendt, H. (n.d.) Summary (Container 39, Arendt Papers, Library of Congress, Washington). 
Arendt, Hannah (1953) Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government. Review of 
Politics 15 (3): 303-327. 
Arendt, H. (1958) The Human Condition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Arendt, H. (1962) The Origins of Totalitarianism, Cleveland: World Publishing.  
Arendt, H. (1965) Lecture Manuscript: From Machiavelli to Marx (Container 39, Arendt 
Papers, Library of Congress, Washington). 
Arendt, H. (1970) On Violence, Orlando: Harcourt. 
Arendt , H. (1973) On Revolution, London: Penguin.  
Arendt, H. (1974) Ideologie und Terror: Eine neue Staatsform. In: Bruno Seidel and 
Siegfried Jenkner (eds.) Wege der Totalitarismus-Forschung, Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.  
Arendt, H. (1978) We Refugees. In: Ron H. Feldman (ed.) The Jew as Pariah. Jewish 
Identity and Politics in the Modern Age, New York: Grove.  
Arendt, H. (2005) Denken ohne Geländer. Texte und Briefe, Munich: Piper. 
Arendt, H. and McCarthy, M. (1995) Between Friends, New York: Harcourt Brace. 
Breier, K.-H. (2011) Hannah Arendt zur Einführung, Hamburg: Junius. 
Cox, M. (2007) Hans J. Morgenthau, Realism, and the Rise and Fall of the Cold War. In: 
Michael C. Williams (ed.) Realism Reconsidered, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cozette, Murielle (2008) Reclaiming the Critical Dimension of Realism: Hans J. Morgenthau 
and the Ethics of Scholarship. Review of International Studies 34 (1): 5-27. 
Frei, C. (2001) Hans J. Morgenthau. An Intellectual Biography, Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press. 
21 
 
Habermas, Jürgen (1977) Hannah Arendt’s Communications Concept of Power. Social 
Research 44 (1): 3-24. 
Hall, Ian (2011) The Triumph of Anti-Liberalism? Reconciling Radicalism to Realism in 
International Relations Theory. Political Studies Review 9 (1): 42-52. 
Hayden, P. (2009) Political Evil in a Global Age. Hannah Arendt and International Theory, 
London: Routledge.  
Heuer, Wolfgang (2006) Politik und Verantwortung. APuZ 39: 8-15. 
Honig, B. (1993) Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
Klusmeyer, D. (2005) Hannah Arendt’s Critical Realism: Power, Justice, and Responsibility. 
In: Anthony F. Lang and John Williams (eds.) Hannah Arendt and International 
Relations, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Klusmeyer, Douglas (2009) Beyond Tragedy: Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau on 
Responsibility, Evil, and Political Ethics. International Studies Review 11: 332-351. 
Klusmeyer, Douglas (2011) The American Republic, Executive Power and The National 
Security State: Hannah Arendt’s and Hans Morgenthau’s Critiques of the Vietnam War. 
Journal of International Political Theory 7 (1): 63-94. 
Lebow, R. N. (2003) The Tragic Vision of Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lukács, G. (1963) The Theory of the Novel, London: Merlin. 
Morgenthau, H. (1929) Die internationale Rechtspflege, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen, 
Leipzig: Noske. 
Morgenthau, H. (1930a) Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen 
(Container 151, Morgenthau Papers, Library of Congress, Washington). 
Morgenthau, H. (1930b) Der Selbstmord mit gutem Gewissen (Container 96, Morgenthau 
Papers, Library of Congress, Washington). 
22 
 
Morgenthau, H. (1934) La réalité des normes, Paris: Alcan. 
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1944) The Limitations of Science and the Problem of Social Planning. 
Ethics 54 (3): 174-185. 
Morgenthau, H. J. (1948) Politics Among Nations, New York: Knopf. 
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1955) Reflections on the State of Political Science. Review of Politics 
17 (4): 431-460. 
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1959) The Decline of Democratic Government. University of Chicago 
Magazine 1: 5-8. 
Morgenthau, H. J. (1960a) The Purpose of American Politics, New York: Knopf. 
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1960b) The Social Crisis in America. Chicago Review 14 (2): 69-88. 
Morgenthau, H. J. (1962a) Politics in the Twentieth Century. Volume I, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Morgenthau, H. J. (1962b) Politics in the Twentieth Century. Volume III, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.  
Morgenthau, H. J. (1966) Introduction. In: David Mitrany. A Working Peace System, 
Chicago: Quadrangle. 
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1968) But are they allowed to do that? Christian Science Monitor, 19 
July: 9. 
Morgenthau, H. J. (1971) Power as a Political Concept. In: Roland Young (ed.) Approaches 
to the Study of Politics, Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
Morgenthau, H. J. (1972) Science: Servant or Master?, New York: New American Library. 
Morgenthau, H. J. (1973) Macht und Ohnmacht des Menschen im technologischen Zeitalter. 
In: Oskar Schatz (ed.) Was wird aus dem Menschen?, Graz: Styria. 
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1974) Decline of Democratic Government. The New Republic, 9 
November: 13-18. 
23 
 
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1976) Hannah Arendt 1906-1975. Political Theory 4 (1): 5-8.  
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1977) Hannah Arendt on Totalitarianism and Democracy. Social 
Research 44 (1): 127-131. 
Morgenthau, H. J. (1984) Fragment of an Intellectual Autobiography: 1904-1932. In: 
Kenneth W. Thompson and Robert J. Myers (eds.) Truth and Tragedy, New 
Brunswick: Transaction. 
Morgenthau, H. J. (2012) The Concept of the Political, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
O’Connor, C. (2013) Arendt, Jaspers, and the Politicized Physicists. Constellations 20 (1): 
102-120. 
Owens, P. (2005a) Hannah Arendt: a Biographical and Political Introduction. In:  Anthony F. 
Lang and John Williams (eds.) Hannah Arendt and International Relations, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Owens, P. (2005b) Hannah Arendt, Violence, and the Inescapable Fact of Humanity. In: 
Anthony F. Lang and John Williams (eds.) Hannah Arendt and International Relations, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Owens, P. (2009) The Ethic of Reality in Hannah Arendt. In: Duncan Bell (ed.) Political 
Thought and International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rösch, F. (forthcoming) Pouvoir, Puissance, and Politics: Hans Morgenthau’s Dualistic 
Concept of Power? Review of International Studies, in press. 
Rohde, C. (2004) Hans J. Morgenthau und der weltpolitische Realismus, Wiesbaden: VS-
Verlag. 
Scheuerman, W. E. (2009) Hans Morgenthau. Realism and Beyond, Cambridge: Polity. 
Scheuerman, W. E. (2011) The Realist Case for Global Reform, Cambridge: Polity. 
Schuett, R. (2010) Political Realism, Freud, and Human Nature in International Relations, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
24 
 
Schulz, D. (2006) Hannah Arendt und die transatlantische Erfahrung. In: Amalia Barboza 
and Christoph Henning (eds.) Deutsch-jüdische Wissenschaftsschicksale, Bielefeld: 
Transcript. 
Simmel, G. (1997) The Berlin Trade Exhibition. In: David Frisby and Mike Featherstone 
(eds.) Simmel on Culture, London: Sage. 
Smith, V. (2010) Dissent in Dark Times. In: Roger Berkowitz et. al. (eds.) Thinking in Dark 
Times. Hannah Arendt on Ethics and Politics, New York: Fordham University Press. 
Söllner, A. (1996) Deutsche Politikwissenschaftler in der Emigration, Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag. 
Solomon, T. (2012) Human Nature and the Limits of the Self. Hans Morgenthau on Love 
and Power. International Studies Review 14 (2): 201-224. 
Sternberger, D. (1976) Die versunkene Stadt. Über Hannah Arendts Idee der Politik. Merkur 
341: 935-945. 
Tjalve, V. S. (2008) Realist Strategies of Republican Peace, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Vollrath, E. (1995) Hannah Arendt: A German Jewess views the United States – and looks 
back to Germany. In: Peter Graf Kielmansegg et. al. (eds.) Hannah Arendt and Leo 
Strauss, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Weber, M. (2004) The Vocation Lectures, Indianapolis: Hackett. 
Williams, M. C. (2005) The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Young-Bruehl, E. (1982) Hannah Arendt. For Love of the World, New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Young-Bruehl, E. (2006) Why Arendt Matters, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
